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At the end of the American Revolution,
the new country faced the task of turning hard-won legal i ndependence into true
independence, which meant that America
would have to become less dependent upon
Europe for both the necessities and the
luxuries of life. Alexander Hamilton was
perhaps the most farseeing of the men who
looked for a course that America should
follow. Hamilton was doubly fortunate
in that he was placed in a position to
help bring about his vision, first as a
leader in the movement to replace the Articles of Confederation with a stronger
form of government, the Constitution, and
second through his position as the first
Secretary of the Treasury under the new
Republic. As a Revolutionary officer,
Hamilton had moved through New Jersey and
visited the Great Falls of the Passaic
River, formed when that river broke
through the 800-ft . ridge of the Watchung
Mountains west of New York City. (Figure
8-1 shows the detailed topography of the
falls area today . ) Thus it was entirely
fitting for Hamilton to play a leading
role in establishing the industrial city
called Paterson, which depended upon the
Great Falls as its source of _power, power
that was to make America independent of
Great Britain in fact as well as law.
Hamilton chose to set up a private
corporation capitalized at $600,000 to
accomplish his vision. Acting at his
prompting, Hamilton ' s friends, led by
William Duer of New York, secured a charter from the State of New Jersey incorporating the Society for Establishing Usefull Manufactures {S.U.M. ) in December of
1791. At the same time Hamilton himself
prepared his famous Report on Manufactures,
which set out his vision for all to see .
The S. U.M. was to be the embodi ment of
this vis ion, demonstrating to American
businessmen that Ameri can manufacturing
ventures could be not only socially desirable but also economically profitable.
At the heart of the establishment of
American manufactures lay the problem of

large-scale engineering ventures. Nothing less than a large factory would show
other Americans that competition with the
British could be both nationalistically
and monetarily satisfying . If it was to
be a large- scale development , then ample
power would have to be available--i.e . ,
the engineering development of a major
river for power purposes. Americans had
never faced this sort of problem before,
and it was not strange that many of the
early engineers on the project either
were foreigners or had received their engineering training abroad . To escape
from dependence on Europe, Hamilton and
his friends were forced to use the services of the European-trained engineers,
at least until America could develop its
own. Yet European talent was not always
successful in answering American needs.
Pierre Charles L'Enfant was a competent
engineer , and yet his plan for Paterson
was not an immediate success . This paper
attempts to show the sequence of power
development at the Great Falls, and to
explain why i t was that the L'Enfant plan
for Paterson was rejected. In the process, it elucidates the problems of early
engineering developments in America.
Given the laws of practical hydraulics
it is not remarkable that there was a
certain congruity among the various plans
for developing the water power of the Passaic Falls in Paterson. The t opography
of the falls and the surrounding area created both the potential for power development and the common problems that all the
developers had to face . Three plans were
evolved. One, the relatively visionary
and expensive Duer-Allon plan, was as
much concerned with land speculation as
with hydraulics. A second , that of Pierre
Charles L'Enfant, provided for an extensive water power system using Europeantype engineering. The thi r d, by Peter
Colt, was the American adaptation of _the
L'Enfant scheme, a plan that stripped the
hydraulic system to the bare minimum necessary for any power.

Figure 8-1
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The conflict among the various plans
is perhaps the most interesting aspect of
the project, for it shows the constant
interaction of various factors such as
cost , scope, time, and the availability
of skilled workers. Presented with two
plans for large-scale development using
complicated construction techniques, the
Society for Establishing Usefull Manufactures chose to disregard the counsel of
both the land speculators and the pr ofessional civil engineer, L'Enfant, and instead used the Colt plan developed by inexperienced American talent, which had
the virtues of being less costly, less
complicated, and less time- consuming for
the untrained local workmen to execute .
However , both of the earlier and more visionary plans were ultimately vindicated.
The Duer-Allon plan closel y resembled
that of the Morris Canal, built after
1828 from tidewater at Newark, New Jersey
across the state to the Delaware River .
Similarly, the original Colt plan at Paterson was modified and expanded between
1800 and 1846 until it resembled nothing
so much as the original L'Enfant plan.
The conf lict between L' Enfant ' s ideas and
those of the Directors of the S.U .M. shows
both the problems of dealing with a proud
and touchy individual and also the difficulty of adapting a foreign technological
style to the solution of domestic problems.
Specifically, L'Enfant envisioned a
combined hydraulic power and transportation canal using the entire flow of the
Passaic River . The design included a
standard European aqueduct carrying the
canal, towpaths, and a carriage road.
L' Enfant suggested the transportation portion of the canal so that local suppliers
could bring products such as building
stone, timber, and agricultural ite~s down
the Passaic right to the factories.
All
the features that L'Enfant planned, including full command of t he flow of the
Passaic River and the locks for transportation, were ultimately incorporated in
the S. U.M. canal system, with the single
exception of the aqueduct . Despite this
vindication in practice , L'Enfant ' s plan
has been l abeled visionary and impractical by both contemporary criti cs and historians of the S . U.M. The S.U.M. Directors at that time, and Joseph S. Davis recently, criticized L'Enfant's plan as too
expensive and g~andiose at an early stage
of the project .
Levi R. Trumbull unjustly accused L'Enfant of the absurdity of wanting to carry
the water some seven miles before using
it, something that any engineer would have

seen as undesirable unless there were substantial additional benefits to be realized by such a course . Trumbull is probably confusing the L'Enfant plan with the
Duer-Allon scheme fQr a transportation
canal to tidewater.J
Many considerations were involved in
selecting a location for a manufacturing
site . Of primary importance was an adequate water supply, something that involved many considerations besides simply
the volume of the stream, such as the vertical drop (head and fall) available, the
distance over which this drop takes place,
the topography of the surrounding terrain,
and the seasonal fluctuations of the
stream flow . Given an adequate· supply of
water power, then other economic factors
became important : access to raw materials;
t r ansportation facilities; labor availability; building supplies; and price and
availability of food. Together these fac tors had to be considered in light of the
economic situation affecting t he whole
project. Capital availability determined
the extent of the project because a small
mill power was cheaper to build, although
more costly per horsepower . Until the
late 18th- and early 19th- century improvements made the steam engine a cheap, reliable, and smoothly rotating power source,
it was absolutely necessary to balance all
these factors since water power was the
only feasible way of operating the mills,
whatever might be the desirability of locating in the major commercial cities .
Selection of the manufacturing site
involved the consideration of all these
factor s, but few people in the countr y
had any experience with hydraulic problems . Prior to the organization of the
Society for Establishing Usefu11 Manufactures with its Charter of Incorporation,
the location of the Society had already
been more or less narrowed down to the
State of New Jersey, based on polit ical
and financial considerations-- the hope of
bringing in both New York and Pennsylvania
investors, and of stimulating native New
Jerseyans to boost their state out of its
relatively obscure and powerless position.
On the hope of securing a charter , Hamilton and others began to look around the
state for suitable locations, long prior
to the actual issue of the charter by the
state on November 22, 1791. 4
In August 1791, Hamilton appointed
William Hall and Joseph MOrt, English
workmen who had recently come to America,
as employees of the Society by authorization from some of the subscriber s to the
S . U.M. prospectus . He promptly dispatched

them throughout New Jersey to look for
adequate sites for the water power, suggesting the Passaic Falls as one. Hall
reported to Hamilton September 4, 1791
that he and Mort found the Passaic Falls
to be "one of the fine st situations in
the world," with everything necessary
available in abundance. Thus, as early
as 1791 attention was already focused on
the Passaic River as the possible site
for the factory. Hall's evaluation of
the site seems to have been primarily
impressionistic, and he made no detailed
estimate at that time of the cost for
providing this power to the Society . 5
William Marshall, another English
workman employed by Hamilton, was better
acquainted than Hall with all the requisite factors affecting site development.
Rather than relying on a simple single
examination of the site, Marshall wrote
the following to Hamilton:
••• if there is not a regular and constant Supply of Water in the driest of
Seasons Sufficient to work the Mill 23
hours per Day, the Interest of the
Subscribers will severely suffer . To
prevent this, Sir, it will be Necessary to be Acquainted with the Source
(if easily possible) of the River, the
Situation of the Country through which
it runs, the Number of other streams
that empty themselves into it, and
from whence or by what means they are
supplied . From these and Similar Observations together with the best Information that can be obtained from
those who have long known the River &
its particularities, a Judgment may
be form'd what Effect a Dry or Wet
Season has on it; that is, Sir, whether
in a drought there will be a Sufficiency of Water to Supply the Works,
and when heavy or continued rains happen, what Effects are to be Apprehended either from its Overflowing , or the
Acc~~ulated Impetuosity of its Current ••• the Speed of the Water must
be taken (by which the Interior heavy
Wheels are regulated) together with
the Quantity of Water it is capable
of· delivering in a given time; ~he
Fall must likewise be measured.
In this quotation Marshall proposed a
complete hydrographic survey of the area
under consideration, and a quantitative
one at that. Whereas modern hydraulic
engineers would have access to better
formulas, techniques, and historical information, Marshall's concern for the
full knowledge of the potential develop-

ment area reflected well on his experi71
ence in practical work. All engineers
would be equally concerned with Marshall ' s
three primary measuring criteria: velocity, quantity, and fall (head). Marshall
went on to stress the t opographic and engineering aspects of the site f or building location, such as the underlying rock
at the site and the ease of providing for
direct (convenient) flow to t he wheel and
drainage of the wheel .
However, the Soci ety did not adopt
Marshall ' s advice f or a full engineering
study in anything but the most s uperficial manner owing to pressure to get the
project underway. Marshall toured sites
in New Jersey searching for locati ons
that warranted detailed investigation,
such as Rahway Brook, Stony Brook, the
~tillstone River, and the First, Second ,
and Third Rivers near Newark. He found
each site unacceptable for good reasons,
except the Second River.7 Meanwhile,
William Duer, the promoter and firs t Governor of the Society, persuaded }~r shall
to visit the Passaic Falls, in company
with a Frenchman named Allon wi th whom
Marshall was totally unable to converse.
Marshall's trip was something less than
an eff.e cti ve inspection because Duer told
him not to give any indication of what
was afoot for fear of raising the pri ce
the Society would have to pay for land.
Allon also got them lost i n the woods and
seemed to have no idea of the proper spots
near the river actually designated for
the cut by which water was to be taken
out of the river and put to work. These
limitations prevented Marshall both from
getting a good idea of the topography of
the area and from learning anything about
other factors he considered important,
such as stream flow in high and low
months, rainfall, and average conditions.8
Apparently as a result of this trip
and others, Duer and Allon proposed their
plan for development , but without Marshall's help. We know little about the
plan proposed by Duer himself in conjunction with Allan, except its general attributes, but this may result from its
sketchiness rather t han lack of sources.
This plan did indeed prove to be more
than the Society could undertake, even in
the bouyant period of the S. U.M. 1 s flotation, when capital was eagerly subscribed
before the books had been opened. Basically the Duer-Allon plan involved two
parts. One was a transportation-hydraulic
power canal from the Passaic Falls all
the way to the head of navigat ion on the
Passaic River at Vreeland's Point.9 From
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the land purchases at Vreeland's Point
undertaken by William Duer through Samuel
Ogden (see Figs . 8-2 and 8- 3, showing attention to rock in the area and height
abovP. tide ), it would seem clear that the
second part of the Duer-Allon plan involved the creation of a manufacturing
town at the east end of the canal, at or
close to the point where it reentered the
Passaic River at the head of navigation
(near modern Passaic). Figure 8- 4 shows
this plan conceptually . Although the
contours shown are those t hat existed as
of 1955, it is believed that the route
would have been equally practical for a
canal in the 1790's, allowing the retention of the entire head of the Passaic
River at the falls of some 115 ft ., less
the necessary hydraulic gradient, with
only minor level gaps to be bridged. It
is also quite possible that the waste of
water over that distance owing to leakage
would have been more than compensated by
acquiring the water of several of the
minor tributaries to the Passaic below
the falls which would naturally flow into
the canal . At Vreeland's Point , the
transportation canal would have allowed
the passage of boats to the river through
a series of locks, whereas the mill sites

would have been located along various
73
tiers of raceways following the natural
contours of the hill at roughly 20-ft.
intervals on perhaps five levels before
the water was returned to the Passaic.
The Vreeland 's Point will sites of the
S.U.M. would have been able to compensate
for the use of water in the transportation section of the canal by having a
larger available head than the 65-ft.
head at Paterson.
The engineering feasibility of the
scheme is amply demonstrated by the later
construction of the ~brris Canal to tidewater along a more or less parallel route,
although that canal was built too late
and too small to compete successfully
with railroads (see Figs. 8- 10, 8-11).
However, engineering feasibility must be
carefully distinguished from the practicality of a plan that involved the enormous task of cutting and embanking more
than seven miles of canal , providing mill
sites and mill races, and building locks,
as well as one or two small aqueducts or
embankments to carry the canal over gullies or valleys.
Despite the fact that Uort , Hall, Marshall , and Allon had all visited a substantial number of water power sites in

Figure 8-3. Detail from Paterson Incorporated [1792], Fig. 8- 2, showing the Vreeland ' s Point
area, now Passaic , N.J., one of the destinations of the VUer- Allon plan. The numbers in the
fi~ure refer to hejghts above tidewater, presumably for planning raceway and factory sites.
(S.U.M. RecoPds, Paterson Board of Finance. Traced fPom the originaL by H. A. E.R.J
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the state by the time of the Society 's
incorporation, no immediate decision was
made on the location of the factory. This
choice was undoubtedly wise in the sense
that it allowed time to secure other sources of advice on the ultimate site, and
also to ask for more information relative
to all sites . The Board of Directors met
December 9, 1791 for the first time and
appointed a committee to evaluate the various sites and proposals . Under Governor Duer's signature, the committee published an advertisement in the state
newspapers asking the localities that
were interested in getting the factory to
submit full and detailed information of
the water power, land, subsistence , population, transportation, and building materials in the vicinity. This advertisement was sound from the standpoint of securing the best information possible and
the widest number of sites, but also represen~ed a car eful political move which
might demonstrate to a suspicious public
that the Society was not trying to be secretive about its plans and operations,
but rather sought to act in an open and
completely frank manner,lO
Apparently the caution of most of the
Directors in settling on the final site
did not appeal to some of the more speculative-minded, such as Duer and Macomb.
In a letter Macomb urged Duer to buy lands
at the Passaic Falls to avoid speculati ve
inflation of the price, should it become
known that it was a favored site.ll
The committee appointed to investigate
the site reported at the next meeting,
January 17, that it was unable to decide
among three principal contending rivers,
the Delaware, the Raritan, and the Passaic. The Board then delegated a second
committee the authority to choose the final location without reporting back to
the Board . 12 They were aided in making
a selecti on by individual or groups of
citizens from the competing localities
who offered inducements to have the S.U.M.
select their area. However, as far as
can be discerned, the committee took no
noticeable action after the January 17
meeting until May.l3 Duer continued meanwhile to act on his own, arrogating to
himself the assumption that he knew better than the others the best location for
the factory, and apparently purchased an
option on land at Vr eeland's Point through
secret negotiations by Samuel Ogden,l4
This would involve the transportation and
power canal system of the full Duer- Allon
plan, and probably the expenditure of an
enormous amount of money, if ratified.

The overly optimistic hopes of William 75
Duer can be measured by the fact that he
actually began to implement the plan for
this transportation-water power canal by
the purchase of the requisite land, Allen 's estimate to Duer for the construction of the whole canal was a great underestimate at ~2000, which, if correct,
would have been economically feasible.l5
Probably this low estimate encouraged
Duer in the more grandiose plan, and his
inexperience in engineering matters left
him unable to discriminate between a bad
estimate and a good one . Shortly afterward, Duer became involved in the financial panic of mid-March 1792 and never
again played an active role in the operations of the Society, dying in debtors '
prison in New York in 1799.16 The DuerAllon plan died with Duer's departure
from the governorship of the S . U.M.
The panic of 1792 came close to crippling the Society as well as its governor, both in terms of immediate losses
and future prospects for attracting ad~
ditional investment. The Society lost
about $68,000 immediately in funds placed
with Duer, Macomb, and others . l7 Perhaps
more importantly the panic killed off the
streams of eager new investors as well as
the bouyant psychology that had prevailed
at the outset of the project. Duer was
perhaps the least important loss to the
company, for although he was a great projector he seemed to possess few of the
talents necessary to carry such projects
to a financially rewarding conclusion ,
Similarly, as shown by his secret agreement to purchase land at Vreeland ' s Point,
he was given to acting secretly on his
own, even if the purchase had proved to
be advantageous for the Society.
In view of the atmosphere created by
the panic, it was probably a much .more
financially conscious and conservative
committee that met in May to consider the
problems of selecting a water power site.
Acting on the information available, carefully using what talent they could draw
on to consider their hydraulic problems,
the Board of Directors picked the location of the Passaic Falls as t he single
water power site for consideration, and
ordered a committee, "that the town of
Paterson be located upon the Waters of
the River Passaick at a distance of not
more than six Miles from the same (Falls]
on each or either side thereof bet ween
the Seat of Mr. Isaac Gouverneur near the
town of New Ark and Chatham Bridge. nl8
After this momentous decision, the Board
appointed a three-member committee, com-
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posed of Nicholas Low (who saw the S.U.M.
through most of the rest of its early
years as Governor), John Bayard, and Elisha Boudinot to make the land purchases
and site location for the town. Although
the Duer-Allon plan was not out of consideration entirely, it was clear that
the committee was to rethink the entire
matter of the canal without reference to
Duer's commitment of the Society to the
lands purchased at Vreeland's Point . l9
The new committee worked quickly to
procure a good plan for the site of the
company factory and town. On May 29,
they visited the Great Falls area, accompanied by General Philip Schuyler, Alexander Hamilton' s father-in- law, 11 and several other Gentlemen well acquainted with
the country and the nature of Water Works
in general, • ••• n20 Philip Schuyler was
probably one of the most technically experienced men in America at the time. In
conjunction with Joseph Hornblower from
England, Schuyler had put up the first
steam engines in the United States for
pumping water from his mines in New Jersey . At this time Schuyler also was involved in the plan for the Western Inland
Lock Navigation Company, predecessor to
the Erie Canal . 21
Schuyler was probably as responsible
as any single individual for the general
location of the water power canal . Hamilton was asked for his opinion on the
proper plan for use of the water power,
and he indicated in his reply that he had
sought advice from Schuyler on the various plans for using the water and locating the factory . As a result, Hamilton
concluded that 11 • • • I now Entertain no
doubt doubt [sic), that the most advisable course is to abandon for the present the Idea of a Canal And to erect
the necessary buildings near the Great
Falls ••• , 11 22
There is a further indication that
Schuyler was the planning force for the
location of some of the principal races.
At the time that Schuyler met with the
committee, they also "employed proper
Persons to make surveys and levels.n23
This survey was undoubtedly the bas1c on~
both used by the Directors in advertising
for contractors on the job and referr ed
to by L' Enfant in his report to the Directors . 24 From that it would seem obvious that the basic direction of the
system was already l aid out, since the
plan refers to stakes with par ticular numbers, which were set by the surveying party, probably acting under Schuyler's advice . Unfortunately, this plan has disappeared ,

Although there is no direct evidence,
it is suggested that Christopher Calles
may have been one of the "Gentlemen well
acquainted with the country and the nature of Water Works in general ••• "who
accompanied the committee to the Great
Falls at the end of May . 25 Colles was
located in New York, was a civil engineer
by profession, and was known to Philip
Schuyler, who was on the inspection trip.
He came to the American Colonies in 1766
after having worked on the navigation of
the River Shannon. In 1774 he was the
author of the plan for New York's first
water system, although the effort was
aborted by engineering problems and the
financial and practical dislocations attending the Revolution . 26 Schuyler was
well acquainted with Colles because Calles was perhaps the first to suggest the
general idea of a transportation canal
along the Mohawk River from Lake Erie to
the Hudson River, a project that Schuyler
attempted to bring to fruition through
his Western Inland Lock Navigation Company between 1795 and 1808. The property
and route of the old company were later
taken over by the Erie Canal project.
Schuyler himself was no engineer, as he
recognized, and he may have asked for
Colles 1 expert assistance in looking over
the scene.27
Hamilton ' s letter28 urged the abandonment of the Canal plan "for the present"
rather than as a totally unfeasible project, and his reasons for rejecting it
were financial rather than practical.
Thus, the abandonment of the Duer- Allon
plan in favor of the mor e limited one of
the use of the water power at the immediate vicinity of the Great Falls represented the compromise between the grandiose but far- reaching plan of Duer and the
pinch of limited resources, caused in
part by the financial misdealings of Duer
himself . The Duer scheme was mor e acceptable in the rosy financial era that preceded the 1792 panic, Yet the dream of
a transportation canal remained alive, for
even Hamilton, the practical financier,
advised the purchase of the lands all the
way from the Little Falls, several miles
above Paterson on the Passaic, to "the
head of navigation of the Passaic, " an
area of almost 84 square miles, which
would encompass the present Passaic Valley cities from Little Falls to Newark.
It was an almost incredible expanse of
land by modern standards, and one that
would have included almost every significant water power site on the river and
kept open the land for the potential
transportation canal route to a mill site
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Figure 8-5.

Detail from Paterson Incorporated [1792), Fig. 8-2, showing the "Garrison's
Brook" area referred to as the other possible destination in the Duer-Allon plan. The
numbers indicate detailed concern with the topography of the area. (S.U.M. Reaords,
Paterson Board of Finance. Traaed from the original by H. A. E. R. )

near Passaic (Figs. 8-2, 8-5, and 8-11
show the area considered and canal plans.)
At the Board of Directors' meeting
July 4, 1792, the Directors ratified the
selection of the location of Paterson near
the Great Falls itself, and the abandonment of the Duer-Allon scheme. Hamilton ' s
plan for the purchase of a large block of
land was eliminated in favor of the purchase of only that land for Paterson itself,
still a sizeable piece of about 700 acres.
Colonel Samuel Ogden was advised to cancel
Duer's options for land purchase downriver
at Vreeland's Point, thus eliminating the
possibility of building the town at tidewater, At the same meeting, the Directors
rejected the similar plan for making a
three-mile transportation canal that would
not reach tidewater. (See Figs. 8-4 and
8-5 for this proposed route and location.)
Although this would have been less expensive than the proposed six-mile canal, it
would not have provided the crucial benefit of access to cheap water transport
all the way up to the factory site.29
Both the Duer-Allon plan for the canal
and the other shorter transportation canal

to Garrison's Brook were vetoed July 4,
1792, and it was agreed to establish the
works in close proximity to the Great
Falls. On July 5, the Directors took
action to commence building the canal.
Thereafter, plans were primarily a matter
of engineering and expense rather than
location changes. In part, this fact was
determined by the topography, The main
probl·em facing all the builders was that
the falls were formed where the river cut
between uplifted ridges of stone, with
the steep uplifted face to the east forming cliffs, To bring water from the riv·e r above the falls to an area of less
precipitous terrain, the engineers had to
deal with two problems. First, a channel
from the river bed had to be cut through
the rocks in order to draw water from the
river. Second, it was necessary to cross
the larg·e gully behind the rocks bordering the river, which was an overflow channel of the river itself (see Fig. 8-6),
If some means were found to carry the wat ·e r over the gully, then yet a third problem faced the developers in the form of
the main ridge that blocked the course of
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Figure 8-6
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the stream to the east. This had to be
cut for the passage of the canal. Once
beyond this point, the problem became the
relatively simpler one of cutting and filling for a canal to take water to the mill
sites. The problem of the gully and the
rocks brought forward at least three or
four different plans for the engineering
accomplishment of the task of getting water to the mills.
The first draft was that of Alexander
Hamilton, who probably worked up the report in conjunction with the committee
that had inspected the area around the
falls plus Schuyler and anyone accompanying him at that time. The Hamilton draft
involved three alternative schemes for
getting the water to the mill sites. Hamilton proposed that a committee of three
be appointed to receive bids for his three
basic alternative plans, probably hoping
that a clear choice of the three plans
would emerge from the bids received from
contractors. Hami~ton's first plan was
to bring the water across the gully by
means of wooden troughs or trunks supported by a wall, after cutting the requisite
channel into the river bed. Hamilton then
proposed carrying the water on to the mill
site with a guaranteed head at that point,
although the specified head was left blank
in the draft. The second alternative was
for the contractor to let the water into
the mill channel. From the mill channel
at surveying stake No. 14 it was again to
be led down to the mill with an as yet unspecified head. This was probably the alternative with the lowest preserved head.
The third alternative involved a combination of alternative one with a plan to
preserve the full head of the river . The
contractor was to bring the water across
the gully in a canal on top of a dam, with
the top of the canal high enough to preserve the full height of the river across
the gully . The contractor was then to
bring the water to the mill with the usual
unspecified head at that site.JO
All these alternatives were designed
to accomplish essentially the same purpose--the end of the canal at the mill
site was the same in each case. The purpose of the three alter natives in the Hamilton resolution was to give the Directors
the choice of three possible bids from the
contractor, so that they could select the
cheapest, or be able to select one if it
was a more permanent type and only slightly more expensive than the others. This
alternative bidding procedure reflects the
general uncertainty over the various possible methods of dealing with hydraulic

problems and the lack of definite know79
ledge of costs of construction in different materials.
A second draft resolution, a modification of the Hamilton one, was adopted and
printed in the minutes and involved a
somewhat more liberal procedure for the
contractor, in that he was not tied to a
particular means of getting the water to
the mill, but rather the route for the
canal was specified with the method of
construction left open to the contractor.
The Society's next move was to send out
for bids on the basis of the second draft
proposal. On July 5, the Directors resolved "that this Board do immediately
take measures to bring the Water from
above the Great Falls across the Gap to
Station No. 14.nJl The Draft Resolution
was embodied in an advertisement published
in local newspapers, which gave the contractors only one method of construction
across the gully.32
:The advertisement called for bids "To
cut a Canal from the River Passaick beginning at a point near a Station where
stands a Stake marked No. 1 & continuing
thence to the brink of a precipice at or
near a rock marked No. J. This canal must
be thirty feet wide and must be sunk to a
level with the surface of the water in the
driest season." The articles went on to
specify the construction of flood gates,
"near the brink of the precipice," and a
dam in the river to be four feet above
the water level at dry seasons. The Directors specified that the gully was to
be crossed on a dry wall, with a trough
(construction material not specified) on
top of the wall. Despite the single suggested method for crossing the gully, the
advertisement also allowed some leeway by
allowing bidders to suggest "any other methods which shall occur to them for constructing a competent wall across the gully from Station No . J to Station No . 6 and
for conveying the Water from thence to
Station No. 7. 11 33
Despite this encouragement to come up
with original and less costly solutions,
there is no evidence that many outside
contractors took an active interest in
the Paterson hydraulic system. On August
2, 1792, the S.U .M. opened the few bids
and found that most were for only part of
the work and all were very much higher
than their estimate . Thinking that they
could do the job better and cheaper, the
S.U.M. decided to enter the constr uction
and hydraulic engineering busi ness. Probably one factor that deterred contractors
from bidding was the fact that they were
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asked to guarantee the work for seven
years after completion, which was unrealistic, given the business and construction
uncertainties of the time.34
Faced with undertaking the job itself,
the S.U.M. now had to transform itself
from a primarily financial operation into
an operating corporate organization. The
transition was neither very rapid nor successful, and the result was divided authority and no clear leadership. It was
not until 1793 that the Society successfully resolved the problem of its superintendency. In looking for a superintendent, the 8.U.M. Directors turned once
again to their prime source of talent and
advice, Alexander Hamilton.35 Hamilton
recommended Pierre Charles L'Enfant, who
attende~ a special Directors meeting.36
Pierre Charles L'Enfant was born at
Paris, August 2, 1754, the son of a "painter in ordinary to the King in his Manufacture of the Gobelins ." He had a relatively undistinguished childhood, although he
did receive at least some instruction in
engineering and architecture. At the age
of 23 he came to the United States to
fight for independence on the side of the
Revolutionaries . He was promoted to major in the engineers t~y 2, 1783, and then
retired in 1784. His principal project
was work on designs for the plan of the
proposed Federal Capitol at Washington.
By June 22, 1791 he had produced the major principles of his Washington design,
based at least in part on European models
and principles. Owing to difficulties
over the integrity of his plans and control over operations, he was dismissed
February 27, 1792. Although both Washington and Jefferson hoped to find some means
of resolving the difficulties so that he
could continue to work on the project,
L'Enfant proved adamant and incapable of
accommodating or adjusting to any changes
or cooperation. He was thus available
for other projects by early 1792. After
his ultimate departure from Paterson, he
designed houses in Philadelphia, including that of financier Robert MOrris (which
reputedly helped bankrupt Morris). L'Enfant died in the United States in relative
poverty and obscurity June 14, 1825.37
Meeting with the Directors August 1,
1792, L'Enfant promised to look over the
condition of the S . U.M.' s plans for the
r aceway system and city and to report to
the committee with his own observations
and plans for both.38 Hamilton ~ave
L'Enfant his highest recommendation in a
letter to the Governor s and Directors of
the S.U.M. from Philadelphia dated August

16, 1792. In it, he indicated that the
problem of bringing water across from the
river to the mills was the principal difficulty, commenting,
On this point I beg leave to say that
nothing ought to be risked . Efficacy
and solidity ought to outweigh considerations of expense if within any
reasonable bounds. I feel persuaded
beforehand that those attributes will
belong to whatever plan Major L 1 Enfant
may propose; and I doubt not it will
meet with the attention it shall merit.39
Thus both Hamilton and the Directors
clearly felt t he need for further ·expert
advice in this pioneering hydraulic project. They hoped L' Enfant would provide
the answers to the problems.
L'Enfant was appointed Superintendent
of the Society at the meeting of August
20, 1792, possibly even prior to the reading of his report on the hydraulic system
and town, which was presented to the Directors at that same meeting. This report,
dated Town of Paterson, August 19, 1792,
represented the first look at the site by
a professional civil engineer. Unfortunately, ' L'Enfant removed the plan of the
canal system and the town when he left
the service of the Society later on, and
these documents were never recovered and
supposedly lost to fire.40
L'Enfant's plan fell into three major
divisions. In the first he dealt with
the plans as proposed by the Society and
the difficulty of carrying them out given
the geological character of the area. In
the second he dealt with the problem of a
direction for the canal, and offered two
possible solutions, stating that he preferred the second and shorter alternative.
In the third section he spoke about the
method for carrying the water across the
ravine, or "cove" as he called it, and
proposed to use an aqueduct of stone arches to carry the canal, a towpath, and
road, rather than a solid wall of stone
as proposed by the S.U.M.4l
One of the S.U .M. plans envisioned
bringing the water into the ravine and
closing the end of the ravine with a dam.
L'Enfant's criticism of this par ticular
proposal was that it did not take account
of the quality of the stone in t he vicinity, which was, according to him, "but a
mass of Rock heaped in broken pieces," and
which he was sure would preclude the possibility of a watertight reservoir behind
the dam. Instead, the water would escape
underneath the dam and through the rock

on all sides, so that much would be lost.
L'Enfant proposed to carry the water
across the ravine on a wall, rather than
allow it to flow into the ravine at all.42
L'Enfant also criticized the second
plan, which involved letting the water
out of the river further downstream and
then carrying it across the ravine on top
of a wall. Instead, L'Enfant suggested
moving the entrance upstream and more in
line with the current of the river, which
would consequently help to create flow
through the channel . This was a minor
change in alignment, but L'Enfant reserved
his most scathing criticism for the proposal to use a wall to carry the canal
across the ravine. He said that this was
"so contrary to the first principals of
Mecanics to admit of no discussion •••• n4J
Instead, L'Enfant put forward the classic
European solution to the problem, the construction of a major aqueduct on a base
of equidistant stone piers, arched between
the piers to carry the trunk of the canal.
Perhaps the most radical part of his solution was an arch width sufficient not only for the flow of the Passaic River
through the canal, but also the provision
of a "Towing Path and Carriage way on
each side."44 Thus the structure was altered from the simple transport of water
in the S.U.M. plans to the multipurpose
function of canal barge and vehicular
traffic. L'Enfant's objection to the
wall proposed by the S.U .M. was that it
would be subject to immediate breaches
owing to the enormous and probably uneven water pressure from above on such a
mass of rough-fitted masonry. Some idea
of the dimensions of such a structure can
be gained from the measurement that L'Enfant specified for the canal across the
ravine, which was to be 33 ft. wide and
probably 7 ft. deep. At the very minimum,
the carriageway and towpath required an
additional 20ft., making the overall
width of the piers and aqueduct about 55
ft., rivaling the Roman aqueduct at PontDu-Gard in France, which may possibly
have influenced L'Enfant since it also
carried a road on the lower tier of arches in addition to the upper level
watercourse .
At the end of the canal across the ravine, L'Enfant proposed a reservoir about
100 ft. wide and 10 ft. deep to act as a
small storage basin for evening out flow
from the river under changing demand.
Exiting from this basin he had two main
raceways for carrying water to the mills.
Each had a basin similar to the larger
reservoir to serve a number of mills.

L ' Enfant proposed to build only one of
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the raceways at the moment for the S.U.M.
mills, leaving the other raceways until
until demand for water increased over and
above the Society's own needs. The two
major raceways would have about the same
head as the Passaic itself, but there
could be perhaps three or four other races
below this highest level, using water
from the first level a second and third
time on its way to the river.45
How did L'Enfant's plan suit the situation? Most previous authors who have
dealt with his contribution have reported
him as being an impractical visionary who
spent money like the ve~ water he proposed
to bring to the mills.46 Trumbull considers him as a wholly negative influence,
wlho was neither a good engineer nor a careful superintendent of expenses.47 Most
of the justified aspects of these criticisms relate to the construction phase of
the operation, when L'Enfant's personality
did create problems. However, there was
certainly no opposition to his plan at
the outset, and for what is worth, history
has proved him right on most counts. He
envisioned a multipurpose structure to
carry water, canal boats from above the
falls, and a roadway to eliminate the
problem of going over the ridge, as did
the Stoney Road of that date. All these
aspects W•e re eventually made part of the
canal system, and at present one of Paterson's main roads, McBride Ave-nue, follows the ·e dge of the raceway from the river (see Fig. 1-2, Article 1). When the
raceway was extensively modified in 1828JO, a canal lock was built into the rock
so that barges could come down from the
Little Falls area bringing building materials. Perhaps only the completion of
the Morris Canal prevented an extension
of the system all the way to tidewater
at a later date. L'Enfant planned to
bring water across the ravine rather than
down through it as a reservoir; this design was ultimately carried out in 1846
and is still a feature of the present
raceway system. The dam across the ravine
adopted by Peter Colt broke down for just
the reason foreseen by L'Enfant--leakage-and ultimately had to be abandoned.48 The
sole elements of his plan never incorporated in the raceway system were the small
reservoirs and the method of crossing the
ravine on an aqueduct. In that respect
L'Enfant's plan ultimately proved· impractical, not because it could not be done
from an engineering standpoint, but becaus•e that type of construction was better adapted to European rather than Amer-
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ican wages, ski lls , and background. Only
when L1 Enfant attempted to bring European
solutions to bear on American problems did
his engineering sense fail him. All in
all, his plan must be called a success,
if ultimate adoption and use is the measure of an engineering plan.
L' Enfant 1 s appointment created ill
feeling among the very men he would have
to work with and supervise, for William
Hall and Joseph Mort, two of Hamilton's
early appointees, had also offered a plan
for the hydraulic system after the bids
had proved unacceptable. The success of
L 1 Enfant 1 s proposal could not but rankle
Hall and Mort.~9 They proposed to execute
the dam and canal for (~?)1945 as far as
the gully according to the committee's
plans three and one. They offered to carry out the whole pr oject for (t?)4070, including bringing the water across the gully and to the mill site, and promised the
additional advantage of a sawmill in the
gully using excess water that would have
been wasted at the cotton mill . 50 It is
nei ther very difficult to believe that
L' Enfant's subsequent appointment over
these men created problems of labor relations, nor to suppose that they were willing to denigrate L 1 Enfant 1 s plans at any
opportunity.
With the acceptance of L'Enfant's design, the focus of activity shifted to
actual construction operations. Here the
most immediate problem was one characteristic of many early American enterprises
of this nature- -supervision. Theoretically, L'Enfant held the position of "Agent
for superintending the erection of the
works [and buildings ]51 ordered by the
Directors ••• • u52 However, at the same
time, John N. Cumming was made the agent
for procuring workmen and materials at a
sal ary of $600. Cumming was a stagecoach
operator in Newark and a stockholder and
director of the S. U.M.53 He was unable
to give all his time to the new undertaking, and L'Enfant proved equally unable
to stick to the problem of supervision.
Thus, in the ear ly period a general lack
of direction f r om above for the actual
construction operations impeded the execution of the project. In fact, the appointment of an overall superintendent
with direction of all the Society ' s affair s did not take place until Peter
Colt was chosen well along in 179).
L1 Enfant began work on the canal almost as soon as he had presented his plan,
August 19, 1792. On August 21, he wrote
to Hamilton that he wished "to assure you
that your favorit Chi ld will be carefully

nursed and bread up to your satisfaction
without Involving the parents in to Extravagant or usless Expence. MY sole Embition being to deliver it worthy of its
father and capable of doing honor to his
Country. "54 Less than a month later he
reported to Hamilton that
The ground through which this is to be
carried is already cleared of all timber and immense Rock removed from the
way of operation s o that I am in hope
in a few weak to be enabled to m~ke a
beginning of the fundation of the grand
acqueduc-- also to open the Rock across
the [h)ill and to make a beginning
Every way proportional to the number
of hand as shall be collected the which
daily Increase in nurober.55
However, L'Enfant also mentioned that construction on the buildings could not proceed as rapidly as it would in New York
because all the materials except the stone
had to be brought in from a distance . In
contrast to what most people have reported, including Davis, L' Enfant seems to
have been generally very interested i n
the problem of the canal, and perhaps
even more so than the buildings, although
workers were digging 50 f oundations for
houses . He clearly recognized that the
principal object, "that of the canal , " was
necessary for the success of the whole,
and said that everything would be carried
along "to be ready with the canal," indicating that he, like the Directors, knew
that the rest was useless without it, and
found this the most crucial part of the
scheme.56
The problem of direction for the S.U.M.
remained despite the appointment of L1 Enfant as head of the works and buildings .
The Society needed someone who would be
competent to manage all aspects of the enterprise and be on the site at all times
to direct operations . At this period in
U.S. history, the problem was almost insuperable. None of the Directors was
really competent to deal with the engineering aspects of the water power system,
since they were primarily merchants, shipowners, and land speculators, rather than
engineers . The necessity to appoint
L1 Enfant had already demonstrated the
paucity of such engineer ing talent among
the native population. But the position
also r equired the business and accounting
skills devel oped in the countinghouse and
mercantil e trade. This skill was certainly available in America, and probably some
of the Directors had it . However, the

talented ones were fully immersed in their
own personal affairs and could not or
would not take a very active role in the
Society ' s day-to- day dealings. They probably felt that their function was to supply the capital and control long- term policy and important decisions, rather than
to exercise active operational control.
Lastly, the position required administrative skill--the ability to harmonize and
direct the actions of a large number of
individuals toward the accomplishment of
a single goal. This supervisory function
was certainly complicated by the number
of strong competing personalities in and
around Paterson. Joseph Mort, William
Pierce, Thomas Marshall, and William Hall,
to say nothing of L'Enfant, all had ideas
of the proper way to run the organization,
and each felt that his way was the only
correct one . 57 The ultimate solution was
to appoint someone over all these competing individuals, essentially a manager,
who had some experience of manufacturing
and business problems .
The first attempt to find a superintendent met failure. Nehemiah Hubbard, the
man chosen for the task, rejected the position in early 1792 for undisclosed reasons. 58
The remainder of 1792 passed without a
superintendent, although apparently there
was a possibility in October that Samuel
Ogden was being considered for the position . Ogden was the brother-in-law of
Gouverneur Morris, a speculator who also
operated an iron- making works on the Delaware for Robert Morris. Hamilton wrote
in October, arguing against his nomination. He claimed that Ogden was disliked
by all the workmen because of his arrogant
manner, that he was undisciplined, and
that he was so opinionated and prejudiced
that Ogden claimed L' Enfant "lmows nothing
of water works when it is well known that
he was regularly bred to this as part of
his profession. He would drive L'Enfant
off the ground in a week." Ogden was never formally offered the position. Hamilton 's concern was undoubtedly a major reason.59
Despite Hamilton ' s rejection of Ogden,
he continued to press the Society to find
a superintendent . In a letter to the Directors written October 12, just three
days after disparaging Ogden, he wrote a
"Minute of Matters which appear to require
the attention of the Directors .•• ,"and
first on the list was the appointment of
a superintendent, "if an unexceptionable
person should present; but if none such
should occur it may be still most advisa-

ble to defer till the buildings shall be 83
erected and the works in operation . "60
The search for a superintendent continued during the fall and winter of 179293. In October, the Directors selected
a committee to investigate possible candidates and report at the next meeting. The
committee eventually eliminated Samuel
Ogden and recommended in January that they
meet instead with Peter Colt of Hartford,
February 1. Colt finally appeared at a
Board of Directors meeting February 19
and was immediately ratified as "Superintendent of the Factory" at an annual salary of $2500, or $1000 more than L'Enfant's
salary.61
Peter Colt may have come to the attention of the Directors, like so many of the
other individuals associated with the
S . U.M., through the contacts and personal
referral service that the Secretary of the
Treasury operated from Philadelphia. In
the process of obtaining information from
manufacturers on the present state of
American industries for his Report on Manufactures in 1791, Hamilton received reports on the Hartford Woolen Manufactory.62 This was one of the largest and
relatively most successful new companies
in America. George Washington reportedly
wore a suit of cloth woven in the Hartford
factory for his inauguration. Peter Colt
had been Deputy Commissary- General for the
Eastern Department during the Revolution,
Agent for Jeremiah Wadsworth, and was at
the time of the S.U.M. offer the Treasurer of the State of Connecticut.63 He
seems to have had the complete confidence
of the Directors throughout the S.U.M. ' s
operations. His experience with financial
and business dealings certainly stood him
in good stead in the Paterson position.
However, and Colt was perfectly willing
to admit this himself, he knew nothing of
the machinery for textile manufacture and
was not himself an eng1neer at that time.64
His capabilities were limited primarily to
the management and careful control of an
operating organization, and the direction
of subordinates.65 His principal problem
was the touchy pride of the individuals
working under him, coupled in some cases
with incompetence. Most of the workmen,
particularly Joseph Mort and William Hall,
harbored the idea that they should have
been offered the position of superintendent. Hall and Mort had already submitted
a proposal for the hydraulic system, and
their noses were certainly out of joint
because the Frenchman L 1 Enfant 1 s plan had
been approved over their's .66 Peter Colt's
direction and control over manufacturing
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operations wer e too much for them, and
all except William Marshall left, although
for most the break was not immediate.
Pierre L' Enfant was a special case.
He was both better paid than the other
workers, and at the same time even more
sensitive about his professional skill.
L'Enfant found it difficult to play a
subordinate role in any operation. Yet
it seems that in this case he was not
solely to blame for the situation leading
to his departure from Paterson. Davis
has accused L'Enfant of excessive absence,
carelessness, and extravagance.67 It is
probably safe to say that he may be acquitted of the last two charges, but the
first is at least partially true owing
to his misunderstanding of the problems
of the Society and American engineering
works in general . Briefly, L'Enfant developed the plan for the engineering of
the Paterson raceway system, carried on
construction into the fall, and then departed, leaving subordinates in charge of
executing the plan. It is hard to know
what more was expected of him, for it was
not uncommon in those days for engineers
to direct a project only through the planning and layout stages , then to depart
for other ventures .68
Also, it was not usual for work on construction to continue during the winter
season. Instead, the hands were furloughed when the ground began to freeze
because it was too expensive to pay laborers when so little could be accomplished.
This seems to be what happened in the Paterson situation. L'Enfant first put his
workers to the task of clearing timber and
rock from the paths of construction . The
obstacle to continuing excavation of the
canal and work on the aqueduct primarily
resulted from the necessity for having
good weather for the former and cut stone
for the latter. "Stone is extracting from
· the quarry and provision of Every sort making to Enable a beginning of the principals and most necessary building for the
manufacture and the Employed--for whom in
waiting til the building are compleated I
have ordered a number of barrack to be
Erected suitable to the various purposes."
He reported that progress on the canal
"will depend greatly of the duration of
good weather and tempery of the approaching season.n69
These steps taken, L'Enfant left Paterson for the winter season. From L'Enfant's
letter of September 1792 until February
1793 there is a hiatus in correspondence,
and we simply do not know what was going
on, if anything. However, with Peter

Colt's arrival on the scene after his appointment February 19, 1793, the picture
of steady progress that L' Enfant painted
for Hamilton in the fall was viewed differently . Colt found the principal workmen dissatisfied with their jobs, the progress on the buildings poor, and the absence of L'Enfant inexcusable:
Several Buildings which have been ordered for manufactures, are extremely
wanted, as well as a durable building
for the purposes of gener al Magazine
or Store House; but Majr. L'Enfant , to
whom this part of the Business has
been confided, not being here, nothing
can be done; and our weavers are working by the day in such wretched Sheds,
that. they loose half their time. In
short no arrangments can be made for
puting things on a more durable &advantagious footing untill the Majr.
returns on the ground.70
Colt's complaints were echoed in a second letter of his to Nicholas Low prior
to March 4, and repeated in a letter of
Nicholas Low to Hamilton on Amrch 4.
Colt wrote the following:
The Absence of Maj. L'Enfant of whom
I get no Intelligence becomes every
Day more distressing not a day passes
without Applications for Employmt . of
Mechaniks & for House Lotts & ca. I
do not feel myself at Liberty to take
a single Step in this business without
consulting him as I am totally uninformed as to his Plans of the Town and
t he general Arrangements made for
building thereon. 71
Low seconded this complaint in his letter,
asking, "What can be the Cause of Maj.
L1 Enfant 1 s extraordinary long absence?
Will you speak to him and advi se him to
come forward immediately . 11 72
In both cases these complaints dealt
primarily with the buil dings rather than
with the canal . Probably L'Enfant's absence was owing in part to his assumption
that no useful work could yet be ·done on
the canal in the early spring, and that
since the buildings were more advanced
than the canal there simply was no problem.
He had provided temporary working quarters
(the barracks referred to in September)
and probably failed to realize the importance of having permanent and solid working quarters for the constructi on and
trial of machinery , even if the raceway
system was not in operation . He probably
felt that demand for house- lots would oc-

cur after the start of factory operations,
rather than at present.
L' Enfant returned to Paterson at the
end of March to begin work, and reported,
I have fund Everything at Paterson in
as good a state as I had promised from
the arrangment made previous to my
leaving the place and Judging from
the progress making in reducing the
Rock I would Continue to indulge the
flatering hope of happily Ending the
opperations of this season, •••• 73
Such was not to be the case, for Samuel
Ogden appeared on the scene and disarranged the plans of the Society, in the
process further alienating L'Enfant from
the S .U.M. Directors and Peter Colt, and
thus helping to bring about L'Enfant's
departure from Paterson.
Some time in March, Ogden broached his
"new" scheme for water power development.
The basic plan was the once-rejected DuerAllon proposal for taking the water from
the Great Falls down to Vreeland's Point
and building the factory at that location.
Ogden had been Duer ' s agent for the land
at that time, and may have hoped to recoup
losses from that venture. It is curious
that Low had been on the committee responsible for the change of site from Vreeland's Point to Paterson. Motives for
his change of mind can only be guessed at,
but the most likely one seems to be Ogden's promise to build at a fixed price,
rather than the risk that L'Enfant's plan
might exceed his estimate of cost (about
$30,000, according to L'Enfant's report
of the limitation placed on him by the
Board of Directors).74 Ogden offered to
build the whole canal and purchase the
necessary lands at Vreeland's Point for
the price of ~20,000 (around $80,000).75
Low brought this proposal forward at a
March meeting (probably the 26th) at which
Boudinot, Colt, and L1 Enfant were present.
L'Enfant became understandably irritated
at the thought that his whole plan was to
be replaced and his successor given more
money, but Low tried to smooth things over
by saying that none of L 1 Enfant's work
would be lost and that he could continue
with construction according to plan since
it would all be part of Ogden's system
eventually. L1 Enfant was not convinced,
and all agreed that there should be a delay in the start of the year's construction until a final decision was made.
L'Enfant laid off those workers already
assembled in Paterson and told new arrivals at the site that they would not be
needed until April 20. This delayed con-

struction a month. A scheduled Board of 85
Directors meeting was postponed until
April 16 to secure full attendance for
making the important decision to accept
or reject the Ogden proposal. Boudinot
urged Hamilton to attend, "if you do not
wish to forsake your child. n76
Despite the decision to postpone hiring hands and dismiss temporarily those
already at Paterson, L'Enfant modified
his resolve and put many men to work at
various projects. According to Colt,
"Previouse to Maj L 1 Enfant 1 s setting out
for Trenton, he directed a number of additional hands to be employed in clearing
the ground for the foundation of the canal, as well as braking up Stone for the
pillars &c. n77 Thus little time was actually lost, although the work may not
have been pushed as rapidly as it would
have been under normal circumstances .
Behind the sr.enes the two forces prepared
for the April 16 meeting. Although we do
not know who voted for which plan, it
seems evident that Hamilton favored the
status quo. and he may have talked with
or written others of his feelings . His
opinion of Ogden ("Mr Ogden is generally
what may be called a Projector & of
course not a man of sound viewsn78) had
already been expressed to some of the Directors, and there is no reason to think
that his opinion of Ogden's proposal would
have differed from his earlier reaction
to the Duer-Allon plan, which was negative.
Hamilton wrote directly to L1 Enfant that
"I cannot imagine that the Director s will
adopt the change. If you are still in a
situation to go on with propriety I wish
you by all means to do it, You may be
assured I shall not be unmindful of the
business.n79
Hamilton proved correct in his hypothesis, for the Directors did not change
their plans, On April 16, Low presented
Ogden ' s proposal, but, "the same being
taken into consideration it is agreed
that the Society has proceeded too far in
their present plan to receed or adopt any
other ."80 On the other hand, the meeting
was no vindication for or ratification of
L' Enfant's plan. The S.U.M. faced serious
financial problems as a result of both the
financial panic and the depressed price of
government securities, in which subscribers could pay part of the installments on
their stock. The Directors attempted to
get L 1 Enfant to concern himself solely
with the problem of the canal, and leave
grand plans for urban avenues to a more
auspicious time. Officially they passed
a resolution that limited L1 Enfant to

86

superv1s1ng the construction of the aqueduct, "in the speediest marmer possible,"
and gave Colt the supervision of all other
buildings , Bl In practice they acquiesced
to L1 Enfant 1 s wish to continue both with
the general town plan and the construction
of the cotton mill. In return, L 1 Enfant
promised that he would bring the water
power into use during the working year
and still give them some cash with which
to operate the mills.82 Thus, within
eight months of assuming the position,
L 1 Enfant had lost at least some of his
expert standing and power. From that
time forward both he and the aqueduct
were clearly on trial.
The trial did not last very long, and
was apparently complicated by the fact
that both Colt and L 1 Enfant were absent
from Paterson for some time--L 1 Enfant
for unknown reasons and Colt because his
family in Hartford was severely ill with
smallpox . BJ As the spring season progressed, it became apparent to the Directors that L1 Enfant would not be successful in fulfilling his promise to bring
the water across to the mill during that
working year, and that money for the workers on the project was continuing to flow
out at an alarming rate. Accordingly, a
group of the Directors met June 9. L 1 Enfant was missing, despite a request from
the Directors that he attend. At the
meeting the Directors decided that the
plan for the aqueduct would have to stop
for two reasons . First, L'Enfant was too
slow in getting water to the mills . Second, "···the funds of the Society are
altogether inadequate to support the expence of the plan, however well they might
approve of it [the aqueduct] if they had
wealth sufficient to accomplish it . 11 84
L1 Enfant may have returned to Paterson
shortly thereafter, but the news that he
was removed from power caused him to leave
again, never to return so far as is known.
Davis argues that the Directors tried to
ease the break by keeping him on the payroll and giving him authority to hire an
assistant, but this results from the misattribution of a letter of August 1792 to
August 1793 instead, 85
L 1 Enfant left Paterson with the plans
for the raceways and city in his pocket;
unfortunately, these documents were never
obtained by the S.U .M. and were reportedly
burned at some time so that they are lost
to history.86 Eventually the S . U.M. abandoned the documents and paid L'Enf ant the
balance of his account, closing L' Enfant 1 s
association with Paterson completely. He
was invited to, but did not attend, a ·Directors meeting July 16, 179J. 87

Several conclusions can be drawn from
L 1 Enfant ' s participation in the Paterson
hydraulic project. It is appar ent that
his personality was a major problem, just
as it had been on the Washington job, His
inability to accept criticism or to adapt
his projects to lower- cost results played
a major part in his firing by the Directors. L1 Enfant obviously thought that he
was to be in charge of all aspects of the
work except the machine- building, and when
some of these were removed from his control he began to lose interest . Nevertheless, L1 Enfant 1 s plan for getting the
water from the Passaic River was a solid
and practical large-scale engineering
scheme . Ultimately, the S.U .M. adopted
almost all his proposals, and thus paid
for them twice. His real weakness was in
using plans that were better suited to
European skills and European finances.
Despite the relatively generous amount of
capital collected by the S.U.M., it was
not prepared to pay for the workers necessary to build an aqueduct such as those
of old Rome or France. Cost of skilled
labor was relatively higher in America
than in France, and L1 Enfant simply assumed that the same number of cheap,
skilled stonemasons would somehow be
available to accomplish his task. Obviously in this case his assumption was
incorrect. In early America engineering
consisted less in building solid, permanent structures than in building cheap,
temporary facilities that would suffice
for a short time.
L 1 Enfant 1 s departure from Paterson
left Peter Colt in full control of the
project--buildings, raceways, and housing-- but it certainly did not end the
construction problems. Colt followed the
simplest and least complicated plan, in
an attempt to keep both labor costs and
engineering requirements low. Instead of
carrying the water aaross the ravine, the
ravine was used as a reservoir. From the
reservoir water passed through the gap
in the rocks (cut by L1 Enfant and extended
by Colt) and into a single raceway, which
continued only to the site of the cotton
mill. Both the excess water and the water
used on the wheel were run across what was
then a marshy expanse of ground back to
the Passaic, as Fig. 8-6 shows,88 The
advantage of this plan over L1 Enfant 1 s
was that a masonry project was converted
to an earthmoving operation. Blasting
oper ations continued to open a channel
from the river to the reser voir , probably
in exactly the same spot as or iginally
planned, since all the sources r eport
that L 1 Enfant had al ready blasted a con-

siderable gap in the rock on both sides
of the ravine.89 Colt began this work
at least by July of 1793 after his return
from Hartford, and recorded that "We are
progressing with our work with as little
interruption as could be expected.n90
Unfortunately we have few letters from
Colt for the period from July 1793 to
January 1794, and are therefore unable to
gauge all the problems he encountered.
However, his efforts were no more successful than L'Enfant's in getting the
water power system in operation during
1793. Much of Colt's time was taken up
in dealing with the various workmen and
machine builders in the factory. As under L'Enfant's direction, work was suspended during the winter season, and not
reopened until about the end of midMa.rch.91 March brought rain, and Dutch
holy holidays interfered with progress in
April, but by May 18 Colt hoped that fine
weather would see the canal finished up
to the mill. By May 21 the canal was approaching the mill, only to have a storm
and consequent flood damage the work in
progress.
Last night at 11 O'Clock I left the
Dam & canal--as I supposed perfectly
Safe; but the person I left to watch
the water, being called off to save
the Gristmill--the water in the Canal
unexpectedly increased so as to run
over the bank at the end near the Cotton mill, & before we could stop [the
flow] carried away the earth so as to
under mine the wall that supports the
Trough that had been made to bring the
water on the wheel & filled the celler
of the mill--! was fearful it had injured the foundation of the mill, but
there is no appearance of any damage
to the House since we have drained off
the water and I hope the only damage
we shall sustain there is the labour
in rebuilding the wall & replacing the
earth &c-- •••• 92
Damage from this flood further slowed
the progress of the work by putting the
sawndll, where the company had all its
lathes for wood and iron, out of action
for some time. Despite the damage Colt
allowed his chief millwright and carpenter, one Usher, to leave June 7, since
substantially all that work was complete.93 Further delays took place at
the end of June when the bank at the end
of the canal near the mill proved sandy
and insubstantial, requiring extensive
additional buttressing . 94 Despite these
delays, Colt was able to get the water
power system for the mill into operation

during late June or early July 1794. Af- 87
ter trial operations, Colt reported in
mid-July that Marshall in the cotton mill
was preparing to "set on water Spining as
a Constant Business.n95- One phase of the
S.U .M. operations was complete.
With the water power now available,
Colt turned his attention to two other
areas of importance for the Society. The
major concern, up to suspension of the Society's operations in 1796, was the spinning business in the mill buildings, and
the associated trades of weaving, bleaching, and printing. Yet there was very
little that Colt or any of the Directors
of the S.U.M. could do personally to advance this business because they lacked
the technical expertise to question the
foremen of the various branches on any
decision. The S.U.M. could only support
men who seemed knowledgeable, pay the
wages and material bills as they came due,
and hope that they were not being cheated
and that business prospered before the
Society's funds ran out. They were certainly disappointed in this last hope,
for the S.U.M. suspended manufacturing
operations in January 1796, dismissed all
hands, and hal ted temporarily the great
experiment planned by Hamilton.96
The second area of concern had to do
with the future of the water power development in Paterson. The Society had just
spent an enormous sum to bring the water
to its cotton mill. Even though Colt had
reduced the potential head available by
allowing water to fall into the ravine,
wasting about 20 ft. of head, the Society
still had a volume of water available that
was more than sufficient to run the single
small factory it had built. Should the
Society extend the raceway system to make
this surplus power available at other locations? Should the Society allow others
to develop the surplus water power and
possibly compete with the Society itself?
If the Society did grant power privileges
to other individuals, should the grants
be an outright sale, or should the Society
lease them? If so, what price or rental
should they charge? These were questions
no one had ever answered before on such a
scale, since such a vast power project had
never before been undertaken in America.
Although not of any great importance prior
to 1796 when the Society ceased direct
manufacturing operations, the answers had
great importance to the later revival of
the S.U.M.97
After 1800, the S.U.M. became primarily
a power developer and real estate firm,
rather than the active manufacturing corporation that Alexander Hamilton had

planned. Manufacturing ventures were and
continued to be relatively risky, and the
Society, in the person of its most important Governor, Roswell Colt, chose to
avoid these hazards for the somewhat more
traditional and conservative course of
real estate promoter and developer. In
effect, the S.U.M. Governor and Directors
admitted that they could not hope to exercise corporate supervision and control
over the nascent industries of that period because neither machines, business,
nor personnel were yet standardized
enough to be easily evaluated by investors. The rewards for backing a Samuel
Slater might eventually be high, but the
wait was long and there were probably ten
people who claimed to know everything
about the machine textile business for
every one like Slater who was really competent.
Colt's opinions on the development of
the water power were based primarily on
his calculation of the cost of the canal
and dam, and the value of the land over
which the raceway system passed. He estimated this cost at $5000, and consequently argued that mill seats 40 by 100 ft .
ought to sell for about $500, including
the right of drawing enough water to turn
a set of millstones (probably about 0.5
sq. ft. of water with a 20-ft. head).
However, he suggested that the first few
lots should be sold for somewhat less,
and offered a mill lot to one Crosbie for
$400. Colt's main worry was with the form
of contract for sale of land and water
rights, and he seems to have accepted from
the very start that the S.U.M. should sell
water lots to outside manufacturers. Colt
questioned whether at such a low price the
buyer of the lot should not assume the liability of interrupted flow owing to accidents that prevented the S.U.M. from
supplying the stipulated quantity of water, citing as his reason the recent failure of the earthen bank of the canal which
interrupted the flow and led him to distrust the reliability of the supply syst~m.98

Colt also seems to have had little
doubt from the very start that the water
power system of the Society would have to
be extended beyond its 1794 limits. He
apparently envisaged the second part of
the present middle canal (shown in Fig.
8-7) going north from the location of the
first mill at Passaic and Mill Streets
parallel with Mill Street along the side
of the hill toward the river. He also
planned to use the tailrace from the cotton mill to drive another set of mills

along the brow of the hill above the river itself (corresponding to the present
lower canal along VanHouten Street).
The only problem with carrying out this
part of the plan immediately was that
during the construction of the cotton
mill water was encountered in the basement excavation. To drain the water,
workers constructed a trench below the
basement level in a northeasterly direction across the bleach field to the hill
near the river (approximately the site
of the present Harmony or Industry mill
lots, as they are now known). Rather than
construct a second trench as a tailrace to
carry off the water used on the wheel of
the mill, or any waste water overflow,
they used the drain for the mill as the
tailrace also. The drain was some 3 or
4 ft. lower in elevation than was actually necessary for a tailrace, and consequently this much potential power was simply wasted. Colt felt that the only longterm solution was to dig a second separate tailrace that would maintain the necessary level going north along Mill
Street and then turn east along Van Houten
Street, as the present lower canal actually does. When it reached the Harmony-Industry mill lots, the canal would have to
be built over the other drain, which was
still necessary to carry off water from
the cotton mill.99
The credit for these later ideas cannot
be definitely assigned. Probably L'Enfant,
Peter Colt, Usher (the millwright), and
the constraints of topography all deserve
a share. Peter Colt's plans were not
brought to fruition during the -early period of the S.U.M.'s activities, since the
interruption caused by the failure of manufacturing operations in 1796 brought any
thoughts of exoansion to a temoorary halt.
Colt himself left Paterson with the tnanks
of the Directors in 1796, and went to work
with Philip Schuyler on the Western Inland
Lock Navigation Company.lOO He eventually
returned to the New Jersey area ca. 1811,
and his son, John Colt, became the agent
and principal engineer of the S .U.M. during it~ period of greatest growth after
1812.101
Peter Colt's ideas were the substance
of the evolution of the water power system
as it was gradually enlarged from 1800 to
1807 (Fig. 8-7). These additions were
sufficient to satisfy all demand until
the late 1820's, when the first major realignment of the hydraulic system took
place to enable construction of an entirely new upper tier of mill seats (Fig. 8-8).
Thus the modest Colt plans were sufficient
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for about 30 years of operation, perfectly
adequate given the desire for low expenditures and quick returns on the part of
Amer ican capitalists and engineers . L'Enfant ' s plan, if adopted at the outset,
would have led to t he lowest total capital
cost, since the system had to be rebuilt
agai n between 1838 and 1846 with a new
dam and inlet from the river (Fig. 8-9) .
However , the S.U .M. and its Board of Dir ect ors were clear ly less concerned about
the total capi tal outlay .than they were
about the necessity to balance capital
outlay against funds avai lable . Peter
Colt was better adapted to strike this
balance, since he had the same American
backgr ound himself, than was the foreigner
L' Enfant , who was never quite able to under stand the Amer ican attempts to economize on first cost at the expens e of
greater ultimate cost . The Paterson hydraulic system represented one of the
fi r st conf licts between European engineering exper ience and American conditions .
The confli ct was not successfully r esolved
unti l the Pater son venture, the Middlesex
Canal, and t he Er ie Canal created a school
of native engineers that could better appreci ate the r ealities of the Amer ican
position , and, in eff ect, create a new
engineering .
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